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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
— oooOooo — 
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( 964300201 
Petitioner and Appellant, ) 
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A husband and wife prepare for a divorce trial and appear to Court. The 
Court advises them that they can either save money by stipulating to issues or fight 
them out in trial, suggesting that the attorneys may receive all of the portions of the 
couple's estate. He states, "My hands are pretty well tied." Thus, the parties agree to 
attempt a stipulation and adjourn in chambers. While in chambers, me Court is 
apprised that the wife is disabled and receives social security. The husband still earned 
a living as a postal employee. The Court declines that the wife is entitled to an award 
of child support based upon her receipt of social security. The Court is plainly in error 
on the law regarding this issue. The wife would not be entitled to an award of child 
support if the husband, or obligor, was on SSI, not when the custodial parent, or in this 
case, the wife receives social security from her past social security contribution. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 
(1997) (2)(h) (appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, 
but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, 
visitation, adoption, and paternity). The appellant (hereinafter "the Husband") 
appealed, but later withdrew his appeal pursuant to Rule 37, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. Also, the Cross-Appellant (hereinafter "the Wife") appealed because the 
Court has erroneously deprived the Wife of child support contrary to Utah Law, 
Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-1, etseq.1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
(1) Whether the Wife, as the custodial parent is entitled to an award of 
child support as the custodial parent, and that the Court committed plain error by 
interpreting Section 78-45-7.5(8)(a) against her amounting to an abuse of discretion? 
In divorce proceedings, including initial custody awards, we give trial courts 
broad discretion. E.g., Moody v. Moody, 715 P.2d 507, 510 (Utah 1985). So 
long as that discretion is exercised within the confines of the legal standards we 
have set, Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074, (Utah 1985), and the facts and 
reasons for the decision are set forth fully in appropriate findings and 
conclusions, Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986), we will not disturb 
> Specifically Section 78-45-7.5(8)(b) (1997). 
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the resulting award. We review the findings made by a judge sitting without a 
jury under the "clearly erroneous" standard of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
52(a). Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 149-50 n.l (Utah 1987); see Utah R. 
Civ. P. 52(a). 
Davis v. Davis, 7,.|i) y M i,.|7 illuili 1988). 
(2) Whether the Court erred by awarding attorney's fees to the 
Husband when she successfully objected to form and content of the proposed Decree of 
Divorce, . the Bell Test? 
Section 30-3-3 of the Utah Code "grants trial courts the power to award -ney 
fees in divorce cases" but the award "must be based on evidence of the 
reasonableness of the requested fees, as well as the financial need of the 
receiving spouse." Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 840 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Still, the decision whether or not to award attorney fees is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court, see id., and we review a trial court's denial of fees 
under an abuse of discretion standard; see Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305, 
1310 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Taylor v. Hansen, 342 Utah Adv. Rpt. 41 (Supreme Court, May 7, 1998). 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
• • ). Utah Code Ann. 8 78-45 7 .> (1997). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case: 
This case arises from the mutual divorce awarded to the Wife and 
the disabled wife and custodial parent of child support from the employed husband and 
obligor. Trial was discouraged by the Court and the Court was clear that child support 
would not be awarded. 
//. Course of the Proceedings: 
This case went through several pre-trial motions where at one point Judge 
L. A. Dever set temporary child support at "$364.50 pursuant to the child support 
guidelines." (R. at 70). The temporary order was "calculated based upon [the 
Husband]'s income $3,212 and [the Wife]'s income of $1,0462. . . ." Subsequendy at 
trial, Judge John A. Rokich declined to award any child support. This failure was 
plainly in error. But when faced with the alternative of going to trial that she may owe 
more to her attorney, she was compelled to proceed forward with the settlement 
process. That day the parties entered into an oral stipulation, then both parties 
appealed for various reasons arguably because neitfier were happy with the stipulation 
they felt was forced upon them. 
///. Disposition in Trial Court: 
Judge John A. Rokich accepted on the record the oral stipulation and 
awarded both parties a mutual divorce from the other. 
IV. Statement of Facts: 
On or about August 12, 1996, the Husband filed for divorce from the 
Wife, (r. at 7), and the Wife counterclaimed. (R. at 19). In these pleadings, both 
parties asked for child support to be assessed. Contemporaneously, on Augst 30, 1996, 
2
 This amount represents the SSI the Wife receives from social security benefits 
due to her earnings alone. 
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the Wife filed Impecuniously due to her disability and limited income. With the 
Affidavit of Impecunious, the Wife also filed for temporary support, including a request 
ition reporting and combined social 
security and disability income of $683. (R. at 26). 
On or about October 28, 1996, at the temporary hearing, Judge L.A. 
Dever appropriately awarded child support to the Wife, (R at 56). Said child support 
was established! ill H$364 Mil puisuanl In (lie child suppoil 
temporary order was "calculated based upon [the Husband]'s income $3,212 and [the 
Wife]'s income of $1,0463 " 
Going into mm mi uie otiici nana, Judge Rokich incorrectly entered 
findings that no child support would be awarded. The ' 
was disabled and receiving SSI, (TT. at 8), and die Court responded with, "I know 
that Immediately after a couple more exchanges, the Court stated, "I probably 
'Imiild li.nr had you ronir mln f liainhcrs and we could din uss this ,ii)d sec it I can t 
get these issues resolved." (TT. at 8-9). Thus they re-adjoumed in chambers. 
The parties then commenced talking about property distribution, which 
included a inanlal home and three rental properties. The Husband's counsel proposed a 
mere $300 a month in alimony. (TT. at 10). Ilie Wife objected, restating that w1leii 
you take into consideration her SSI and so forth. Counsel added, "But she has had to 
3
 This amount represents (In11 S S I Him Wilr receive, tioni social secui il\ kncTits 
due to her earnings alone. 
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borrow a substantial amount of money during the pendency of this action." (TT. at 10-
11). The Court responded, "I don't doubt that. What about the child, though?" 
Counsel advised him that the Wife believes that ultimately the Court would find that the 
Husband actually earns "$3,016 as his final income." (TT. at 11). 
The parties went on to discuss loans the Wife received from her father 
and the Court stated, "I don't believe that" apparently believing that the money from 
her father may not necesssarily be gifted her her. The Court went on, "I think the 
alimony, well, the alimony award, I don;t see any way out of it. Divide the property 
and alimony at $300 a month may not be enough, What about the child? If is because 
of her she is getting the --" (TT. at 12). The Court was cut off by the Wife's attorney 
who attempted to clarify, "That's correct. Stuff he has to sign." Substantially 
confused, the Court stated, "So he is alleviated that obligation evidently by getting the 
social security and paying for the child. So he has got to pay more than (inaudible). I 
will equalize it out. Her total income would be about equal to what he has got. And 
they both share the debts equally and divode the property up equally." 
Counsel for the Husband then asked, "So what is the Court's suggestion if 
we do divide it equally, how much are we looking at?" The Court answered, "Well, it 
depends on--if he has got~if she has got a $1073 now and what's his net after taxes, 
what is his taxes.4 
4
 Apparendy the court was confused as he was taking the Wife's SSI and disability 
into account as an income and child support obligation. The Wife believes that the court 
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The parties went on discussing various matters but all concerning 
alimony, which included the reciting of the figures from the Husband s Fimmiiat 
De(ItiraiiiHL Saidl fii'inr aiyucil In the Wife's attorney was "$3,212" when 
considering the Husband's extra income of $200. (TT. at 15). Thus the court found 
that the Husband was taking home $2,804. (TT, a* 1/;>i And ultimately the court 
calculated a I'indin^ ui'$11 <>u0 of ,iu una 
(T .ius concluded an award of alimony at $600 to the Wife. 
Upon this conclusion, Ms. Lems, counsel for the Husband asked, "Is that 
in addition to the child support?" The court, still apparently confused responded, 
"She' s not paying <UJ> dnhl ;«,yp(MH( da anse—she only IV-I v mc--hnu much are you 
getting in child support, $1,073; right?" The Wife exclaimed, "That's my social 
security money. That's not child support." The court then asked, I thought I saw in 
here that you were getting so much per month loi a iliillil "Viiill I he W ite ivphcd, 
"$386 because 1 ,tm disabled." "So you are getting this $386 for child for—said the 
court and the Wife finished with, "I get $1,073 total." So with that, the court 
reiterated, "That's what I said, $1,073. So, if he pays about $600 that makes you 
about equal, 
support or alimony, I don't know. (Inaudible) the child is getting that income. (TT. at 
17). 
was apparently replacing the disability payment to the child that the Wife had paid into 
thus relieving the Husband of any child support obligation. 
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Ms. Lems apparentiy knew as well that the court was mistaken as she 
asked again, "So, are you suggesting, Your Honor, just to make sure that I am clear, 
that we would divide the properties in half and that he would pay $600 a month then in 
alimony . . . . and there would be no additional sums owing on child support . . . since 
she does get dependent disability income for the child." The court agreed. (TT. at 18). 
Then the Wife's attorney attempted to elaborate that this still would not equalize the 
disparity in the couple's incomes as there would be a difference of approximately 
$300.5 The court responded to arguments, "Just divide everything equally. The only 
thing I can do is divide it all equally. She pays - - well, get to that now. She'l pay her 
fees and he'll pay his fees and if we are going to divide it up equal, they are going to 
pay all the debts, split the debts, each pay their own fees and costs."6 At any rate, the 
mediation continued. 
Then while the parties later addressed other child maintenance issues, 
particularly the health insurance premium through the Husband's employment. The 
Husband objected to having to pay the full $18 monthly payment. So the court wanted 
to split it. The Wife's attorney responded, " But he's not paying any child support." 
And the court agreed. Counsel went on, "So, I think that that should just be awash at 
5$300 is nearly the same amount of the prior Judge Dever temporary child support 
award of $364.50. (TT. at 70). 
6
 This response appears to be equally confused as it does not actually apply to the 
arguments. 
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minimum. I mean, he is not paying anything in child support. He is getting benefits." 
The court ignored the attempt keeping the amount split and asked them to get out their 
calculators. (TT. at 22). 
The parties continued to show dissatisfaction, thus the court declared, 
Let me tell you what I think. One thing. Now, you can be hear and you can go 
to trial, you will spend more money on attorney's fees than what you are 
fighting about. So be reasonable. In order to get these things resolved, you 
have to be reasonable. It's not a life and death matter. You know, I don't know 
why people — what price you put on peace of mind. Is it wourth fighting one 
another over a piece of furniture or over a $500 camper? Is it worth it? 
Like I have seen here, I just had a case here not too long ago, the people 
wound up owing the attorneys more than their estate was worth. So, if you want 
to do that, fine. I can take the bench and (inaudible). My hands are pretty well 
tied. I have some discretion, but I am going to divide everting equally, but, 
gees, if you are going to be fighting about a camper or some furniture, then 
(inaudible) pretty well assured of getting your alimony regularly, unless they fire 
him, that's highly unlikely as a postal worker, so look at the pluses. I have so 
many come in that are awarded alimony that never get paid. So, just have a 
litde give and take and I think you can get this worked out.7 
(TT. at 26). With that counsel for the Husband concurred and the court recessed while 
the Wife and her counsel discussed their options. It was clear though no matter what, 
the court would not entertain die child support issue. 
Thereafter, the parties entered into an oral stipulation which was read into 
the record. (TT. at 27). In the record, the provision regarding child support read, 
"The amount that the defendant is receiving for the minor child on the disability income 
7
 The court's admonishment was inaccurate as the judge is a divorce proceeding has 
broad discression and his hands really are not so tied up. Nonetheless, the admonishment 
was clear to the Wife that she would have to appeal to get anywhere with the child support 
issue. 
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will substitute as any type of child support. Therefore, there will be no order of child 
support that [the Husband] has to pay [the Wife]. (TT. at 28). 
Thereafter, the counsel for the Wife, added, "If I can have one moment? 
There is a couple of clarifications, Your Honor, for me. First off, in regards to the 
child support, the order should read something to the effect that so long as - -" The 
court cut him off stating, "As the government is paying for it, social security?" Mr. 
Oliver agreed and attempted to explain just to be cut-off again, "Otherwise - -" , by the 
court, "Well, I don't want to get in trouble. I was going to call that to your attention 
anyhow." (TT. at 33). Thereafter, once the stipulation was completed, both parties 
answered "Yes" when asked if they agreed to the stipulation. (TT. at 34). However, 
both parties immediately appealed once, the decree was entered. 
Meanwhile, the Husband's counsel agreed to prepare the proposed final 
pleadings. (TT. at 38). But the initial set was not acceptable and the Wife objected. 
(R. at 211-215). The court approved sustained some of the objections, but overturned 
others. Nonetheless, and in spite of the Wife disability and indigency, the court 
awarded the Husband attorney's fees of $400. (R. at 261). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The court's refusal to award the Wife child support is contrary to Section 
78-45-7.5 (1997) and based upon his clearly erroneous understanding of the social 
security and disability benefit received by the Wife. Section 78-45-7.5 substitutes the 
10 
social security benefit in lieu of child support when the obligor is the party receiving 
the social security benefit not the custodial parent. 
Moreover, it was well established that the Wife is disabled and on a fixed 
income. The Wife filed as an indigent litigant while the Husband received incme which 
clearly exceeded the Wife. Nevertheless, the court awarded the Husband attorney's 
fees of $400 for having to defend the Wife's objections which some were meritorious, 
but all were brought or asserted in good faith. The award was unreasonable as it was 
contrary to the Bell Test and Section 30-3-3. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
THE DENIAL OF CHILD SUPPORT WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
The Wife urges this court to rule that the judge's findings of her social 
security and disability income $1,073 does not preclude the Husband from a child 
support obligation. The relevant statutory provision at issue is Section 78-45-7.5. 
Subsection 78-45-7.5(8)(b) reads, inter alia: 
Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a parent shall 
be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning record it is based, 
by crediting the amount against the potential obligation of the parent. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5 (1997). 
The appellate courts have outlined the criteria upon which a party may 
successful rely on the plain error doctrine. To establish plain error, the party must 
show that: "(i) An error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial 
i i 
court; and (iii) the error is harmful." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
An error is harmful if, "absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable outcome" for the defendant, or "our confidence in the verdict is 
undermined." Id. at 1208-09. 
In this matter, the issue of child support meets the test outlined in Dunn. 
First, the failure to set child support is clear error as child support is mandated for all 
persons who are noncustodial parents as proscribed by the Uniform Civil Liability for 
Support Act. Second, this error should have been obvious to the trial judge. As a 
matter of fact, both attorneys kept asking for clarification about the child support issue. 
It was clear in the record as identified above, that once the alimony issue had been 
discussed and the court ordered that $600 would be appropriate, thereafter the 
Husband's attorney asked if that would be in addition to child support, and again. (TT. 
at 17-18). Finally, it is equally clear that the Wife has been, is, and shall continue to 
be harmed by this decision. The intent of child support is to assist her in maintaining a 
roof over the child's head. This obligation is both parents to maintain. In reading 
Subsection 78-45-7.5(8)(b), no where does it alleviate the Husband from his child 
support obligation. That subsection provides that the Wife is receiving Social Security 
benefits is credited towards her income as her income. No part of the benefits received 
by the Wife is attributed to the Husband's income to alleviate or obviate his child 
support obligation. In this matter, there remains an addition $300 between the parties' 
12 
incomes that remain disparate between the Husband's income and the Wife's benefits 
and alimony that can be applied in this matter towards the child support obligation. 
The $600 alimony without child support is insufficient for the Wife and the parties' 
daughter. Child support should awarded in addition to alimony. 
POINT II. 
THE $400 AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IS UNREASONABLE UNDER THE 
EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES. 
The Bell Court established a procedure and a test for determining the 
award of attorney's fees by the trial court. The test established consists of a three 
prong analysis. The first of the three prongs involves an examination of the need of the 
spouse who is requesting the payment of attorney's fees. The second prong involves an 
analysis of the spouse who may be required to pay the attorney's fees. The final prong 
deals with the reasonableness of the amount of the fees (see Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489 
(UtahApp. 1991). 
The Bell Court stated: 
To permit meaningful review of the trial court's discretionary ruling, "we have 
consistently encouraged trial courts to make findings to explain the factors which 
they considered relevant in arriving at an attorney fee award." Regional Sales 
Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210, 1215 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); see also 
Martindale v. Adams, 777 P.2d 514, 518 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (for meaningful 
appellate review trial court must explain factors and basis for sua sponte 
reduction of attorney fees); Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) (award of attorney fees in divorce case remanded for more adequate 
findings). In Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), 
we held it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to award less than the 
claimed amount of attorney fees without any reasonable justification, and that a 
trial court must explain its sua sponte reduction in order to permit meaningful 
13 
review on appeal. See also Regional Sales Agency, Inc., 784 P.2d at 1215 
(findings particularly important when the trial court has reduced the attorney fees 
from the amount requested, and amount requested was supported by undisputed 
evidence); Martindale, 777 P.2d at 518. 
Id. In this matter the award of attorney's fees did not follow any Bell Test. The court 
entered the amount of $400~apparently an arbitrary amount. The main point to 
consider is that the the Bell Test is very similar to the Jones Factors. For all practical 
purposes, the same factors, or prongs, are considered in assessing attorney's fees as 
they are in determining alimony. In this matter, alimony was awarded to the Wife. 
Contrary to that award, the court imposed attorney's fees against the Wife even though 
she was partially meritorious with her objections toward the proposed final documents. 
It appeared to the Wife, that perhaps the trial judge became confused as to who 
objected and who prevailed on the objections. Perhaps the judge figured that the $400 
were to be awarded to the Wife and not vice versa. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court clearly and prejudicially committed reversible error in 
declining to award the Wife child support and by assessing attorney's fees against her. 
Hence, this Honorable Court should vacate the order and reverse the trial court's 
decision as to these awards and remand them for determination. Moreover, the Wife 
respectfully requests that this Court mandate that the child support may be applied 
retroactively to the date of the entry of the Decree of Divorce. 
14 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of 
January, 1999. 
^A, 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Respondent and Cross-Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING faffi 
I, D. Bruce Oliver, hereby certify that on this 3j& day of January, 
1999,1 served a copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT, postage 
prepaid, to: Wendy J. Lems, LARSEN & MOONEY LAW, 50 West Broadway, First 
Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
ADDENDA 
9 HUSBAND AND WIFE 30-3-3 
Section 
30-3-11.2. 
30-3-11.3. 
30-3-12. 
30-3-13. 
30-3-13.1. 
30-3-14. 
30-3-14.1. 
30-3-15. 
30-3-15.1. 
30-3-15.2. 
30-3-15.3. 
30-3-15.4. 
30-3-16. 
30-3-16.1. 
30-3-16.2. 
30-3-16.3. 
30-3-16.4. 
30-3-16.5. 
30-3-16.6. 
30-3-16,7, 
30-3-17. 
30-3-17.1. 
30-3-18. 
30-3-19 to 
30-3-32. 
30-3-33. 
30-3-34. 
30-3-35. 
30-3-35.5. 
30-3-36. 
30-3-37. 
30-3-38. 
Family Court Act —Purpose*, 
Appointment of counsel for child. 
Mandatory educational course for divorcing 
parents — Purpose — Curriculum — Excep-
tions. 
Courts to exercise family counseling powers. 
Repealed. 
Establishment of family court division of dis-
trict court. 
Repealed. 
Designation of judges — Terms. 
Repealed. 
Appointment of domestic relations counselors, 
family court commissioner, and assistants 
and clerks. 
Repealed. 
Commissioners — Powers. 
Salaries and expenses. 
Repealed. 
Jurisdiction of family court division — Powers. 
Petition for conciliation. 
Contents of petition. 
Procedure upon filing of petition. 
Fees. 
Information not available to public. 
Effect ofjoetition — Pendency of action. 
Power and jurisdiction of judge. 
Proceedings deemed confidential — Written 
evaluation by counselor. 
Waiting period for hearing after filing for. di-
vorce — Exemption — Use of counseling and 
education services not to be construed as 
condonation or promotion. 
30-3-31. Repealed. 
Visitation — Intent — Policy — Definitions. 
Advisory guidelines. 
Best interests — Rebuttable presumption. 
Minimum schedule for visitation for children 5 
to 18 years of age. 
Minimum schedule for visitation for children 
under five years of age. 
Special circumstances. 
Relocation. 
Pilot Program for Expedited Visitation En-
forcement. 
30-3-1. Procedure — Residence — Grounds. 
(1) Proceedings in divorce are commenced and conducted as 
provided by law for proceedings in civil causes, except as 
provided in this chapter. 
(2) The court may decree a dissolution of the marriage 
contract between the petitioner and respondent on the 
grounds specified in Subsection (3) in all cases where the 
petitioner or respondent has been an actual and bona fide 
resident of this state and of the county where the action is 
brought, or if members of the armed forces of the United 
States who are not legal residents of this state, where the 
petitioner has been stationed in this state under military 
orders, for three months next prior to the commencement of 
the action. 
(3) Grounds for divorce: 
(a) impotency of the respondent at the time of mar-
riage; 
(b) adultery committed by the respondent subsequent 
to marriage; - —* 
(c) willful desertion of the petitioner by the respondent 
for more than one year; 
(d) willful neglect of the respondent to provide for the 
petitioner the common necessaries of life; 
(e) habitual drunkenness of the respondent; 
(f) conviction of the respondent for a felony, 
(g) cruel treatment of the petitioner by the respondent 
to the extent of causing bodily injury or great mental 
distress to the petitioner; 
(h) irreconcilable differences of the marriage; 
(i) incurable insanity, or 
(j) when the husband and wife have lived separately 
under a decree of separate maintenance of any state for 
three consecutive years without cohabitation. 
(4) A decree of divorce granted under Subsection (3Xj) does 
not affect the liability of either party under any provision for 
separate maintenance previously granted. 
(5) (a) A divorce may not be granted on the grounds of 
insanity unless: 
(i) the respondent has been adjudged insane by the 
appropriate authorities of this or another state prior 
to the commencement of the action; and 
(ii) the court finds by the testimony of competent 
witnesses that the insanity of the respondent is 
incurable, 
(b) The court shall appoint for the respondent a guard-
ian ad litem who shall protect the interests of the respon-
dent A copy of the summons and complaint shall be 
served on the respondent in person or by publication, as 
provided by the laws of this state in other actions for 
divorce, or upon his guardian ad litem, and upon the 
county attorney for the county where the action is pros-
ecuted. 
(c) The county attorney shall investigate the merits of 
the case and if the respondent resides out of this state, 
take depositions as necessary, attend the proceedings, and 
make a defense as is just to protect the rights of the 
respondent and the interests of the state. 
(d) In all actions the court and judge have jurisdiction 
over the payment of alimony, the distribution of property, 
and the custody and maintenance of minor children, as 
the courts and judges possess in other actions for divorce. 
(e) The petitioner or respondent may, if the respondent 
resides in this state, upon notice, have the respondent 
brought into the court at trial, or have an examination of 
the respondent by two or more competent physicians, to 
determine the mental condition of the respondent. For 
this purpose either party may have leave from the court to 
enter any asylum or institution where the respondent 
may be confined. The costs of court in this action shall be 
apportioned by the court. 1997 
30-3-2. Right of husband to divorce. 
The husband may in all cases obtain a divorce from his wife 
for the same causes and in the same manner as the wife may 
obtain a divorce from her husband. 2953 
30-3-3. Award of costs, attorney and witness fees — 
Temporary alimony. 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3,4, or 6, and 
in any action to establish an order of custody, visitation, child 
support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, 
the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and 
witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party 
to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The 
order may include provision for costs of the action. 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, visitation, 
child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic 
case, the court may award costs and attorney fees upon 
determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the 
claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no 
fees or limited fees against a party if the court finds the party 
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is impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not 
awarding fees. 
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may 
order a party to provide money, during the pendency of the 
action, for the separate support and maintenance of the other 
party and of any children in the custody of the other party. 
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the 
final order or judgment may be amended during the course of 
the action or in the final order or judgment. 1993 
30-3-4. Pleadings — Findings — Decree — Use of affi-
davit — Sealing. 
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and signed by the 
petitioner or petitioner's attorney. 
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted upon default 
or otherwise except upon legal evidence taken in Ihe 
cause. If the decree is to be entered upon the default of the 
respondent, evidence to support the decree may be sub-
mitted upon the affidavit of the petitioner with the ap-
proval of the court. 
(c) If the petitioner and the respondent have a child or 
children, a decree of divorce may not be granted until both 
parties have attended the mandatory course described in 
Section 30-3-11.3, and have presented a certificate of 
course completion to the court. The court may waive this 
requirement, on its own motion or on the motion of one of 
the parties, if it determines course attendance and 
completion are not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in 
the best interest of the parties. 
(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be held 
before the court or the court commissioner as provided by 
Section 78-3-31 and rules of the Judicial Council. The 
court or the commissioner in all divorce cases shall enter 
the decree upon the evidence or, in the case of a decree 
after default of the respondent, upon the petitioner's 
affidavit. 
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be sealed by 
order of the court upon the motion of either party. The sealed 
portion of the file is available to the public only upon an order 
of the court. The concerned parties, the attorneys of record or 
attorney filing a notice of appearance in the action, the Office 
of Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings has applied 
for or is receiving public assistance, or the court have full 
access to the entire record. This sealing does not apply to 
subsequent filings to enforce or amend the decree. 1997 
30-3-4.1 t o 30-3-4.4. Repealed. 1990 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and 
health care of parties and children — Divi-
sion of debts — Court to have continuing 
jurisdiction — Custody and visitation — De-
termination of alimony — Nonmeritorious pe-
tition for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may 
include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, 
debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the 
following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of 
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of 
the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable 
cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of 
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance 
for the dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible 
for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabili-
ties of the parties contracted or incurred during 
marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respec-
tive creditors or obligees, regarding the court's divi-
sion of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding 
the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; 
and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance 
with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order deterrnining child 
support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a 
portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or train-
ing of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the 
circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent chil-
dren would be adequately cared for, it may include an order 
allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or train-
ing of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subse-
quent changes or new orders for the custody of the children 
and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and 
for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is 
reasonable and necessary. 
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grand-
parents, and other members of the immediate family, the 
court shall consider the best interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for 
peace officer enforcement, the court may include in an 
order establishing a visitation schedule a provision, 
among other things, authorizing any peace officer to 
enforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under 
this chapter. 
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visita-
tion provisions of a court order is made and denied, the court 
shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees 
expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court 
determines that the petition was without merit and not 
asserted or defended against in good faith. 
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a 
visitation order by a parent, a grandparent, or other member 
of the immediate family pursuant to Section 78-32-12.2 where 
a visitation right has been previously granted by the court, the 
court may award to the prevailing party costs, including 
actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing 
party because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise 
court-ordered visitation. 
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following fac-
tors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipi-
ent spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to 
produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide 
support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in 
detennining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the 
standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in 
determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (a). 
However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and 
equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base ali-
mony on the standard of living that existed at the time of 
trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children 
have been conceived or born during the marriage, the 
court may consider the standard of living that existed at 
the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, 
attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of 
living. 
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ttatiparjent. Other, unearned income^otal child may be 
considSgd^ai incdme,,to a* parent depending upon, the 
circumstances of each case.A 1997 
78-45-7.6, Adjusted gross income. 
(1) As*\ised in the^guideunes, 'adjusted gross income* is the 
amount calculated by subtracting from gross income alimony 
previousIVrordered and "paid a n d child~suppbrt~ previously 
ordered!!' 
(2)-The guiaeiines do'not'reduce the* total child support 
award by: adjusting the gross incomes" of the. parents' for 
alimony ordered in the pendmg*proceeding.r In establishing 
alimony, the court shall consider that in determining the child 
support, the guidelines do not provide a deduction from gross 
income for alimony. 1989 
78-45-7.7/ Calculat ion of obligations. _ 
(1) The parents' child support obligation shall be divided 
between them in proportion to their adjusted gross incomes, 
unless the low income table is applicable. 
(2) Except in cases of joint physical custody and split 
custody as defined in Section 78-45-2 and in cases"where the 
obligors adjusted gross income is $1,050 or less monthly, the 
base child support award shall be determined as follows: 
(a) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the parents 
and determine the base combined child support obligation 
using the base combined child support obligation table. 
(b) Calculate each parent's proportionate share of the 
base combined child support obligation by multiplying the 
combined child support obligation by each parent's per-
centage of combined adjusted gross income. 
(3) In cases where the monthly adjusted gross income of the 
obligor is between $650 and $1,050, the base child support 
award shall be the lesser of the amount calculated in accor-
dance with Subsection (2) and the amount calculated using 
the low income table. 
(4) The base combined child support obligation table pro-
vides combined child support obligations for up to six children. 
For more than six children, additional amounts may be added 
to the base child support obligation shown. Unless rebutted by 
Subsection 78-45-7.2(3), the amount ordered shall not be less 
than the amount which would be ordered for up to six 
children. 
(5) If the monthly adjusted gross income of the obligor is 
$649 or less, the court or administrative agency shall deter-
mine the amount of the child support obligation on a case-by-
case basis, but the base child support award shall not be less 
than $20. 
(6) The amount shown on the table is the support amount 
for the total number of children, not an amount per child. 
1994 
78-45-7.8. Split custody — Obligation calculat ions. 
In cases of split custody, the base child support award shall 
be determined as follows: 
(1) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the parents 
and determine the base combined child support obligation 
using the base combined child support obligation table. 
Allocate a portion of the calculated amount between the 
parents in proportion to the number of children for whom 
each parent has physical custody. The amounts so calcu-
lated are a tentative base child support obligation due 
each parent from the other parent for support of the child 
or children for whom each parent has physical custody. 
(2) Multiply the tentative base child support obligation 
due each parent by the percentage that the other parents 
adjusted gross income bears to the total combined ad-
justed gross income of both parents. 
(3) Subtract the lesser amount in Subsection (2) from 
the larger amount to determine the base child support 
award to be paid by the parent with the greater financial 
obligation. 1994 
78-45-7.9 .TT J o i n t p h y s i c a l c u s t o d y . Obl igat ion calcu-
lations. 
In cases of joint physical custody, the base child support 
award shall be determined'as follows: 
(1) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the parents 
and determine the base combined child support obligation 
using tHe base combined'child support obhgation tafifc-
T (2) Calculate'each parenfs'proportionate share of the 
base combined child support obligation by multiplying the. 
base combined[child support obligation by/each parent's 
percentage of'combined* adjusted gross1 ^ income,
 c The, 
amounts so calculated are a tentative base child support 
obligation^ due from eactf^parcmtffhr support of t h e chil-
dren! 
(3) Multiply each parent's tentative base child support 
obligation by the percentage of time the children spend 
with the other parent to determine each parent's tentative 
obligation to the other parent. 
(4) Calculate the base child support award to be paid 
by the obligor by subtracting the lesser amount calculated 
in Subsection (3) from the larger amount. 
(5> The parent determined to be the obligor in Subsec-
tion (4) shalfpay the amount calculated in Subsection (4) 
when the obligee has physical custody. 1994 
78-45-7.10. Reduction when child becomes 18. 
(1) When a child becomes 18 years of age, or has graduated 
from high school during the child's normal'and expected year 
of graduation, whichever occurs later, the base child support 
award is automatically reduced to reflect the lower base 
combined child support obligation shown in the table for the 
remaining number of children due child support, unless oth-
erwise provided in the child support order. 
(2) The award may not be reduced by a per child amount 
derived from the base chi^d support award originally ordered. 
1994 
78-45-7.11. Reduction for extended visitation. 
(1) The child support order shall provide that the base child 
support award be reduced by 50% for each child for time 
periods during which the child is with the noncustodial parent 
by order of the court or by written agreement of the parties for 
at least 25 of any 30 consecutive days. If the dependent child 
is a client of cash assistance provided under Title 35A, 
Chapter 3, Part 3, Family Employment Program, any agree-
ment by the parties for reduction of child support during 
extended visitation shall be approved by the administrative 
agency. However, normal visitation and holiday visits to the 
custodial parent shall not be considered an ii .~erruption of the 
consecutive day requirement. 
(2) For purposes of this section the per child amount to 
which the abatement applies shall be calculated by dividing 
the base child support award by the number of children 
included in the award. 1997 
78-45-7.12. Income in excess of tables. 
If the combined adjusted gross income exceeds the highest 
level specified in the table, an appropriate and just child 
support amount shall be ordered on a case-by-case basis, but 
the amount ordered may not be less than the highest level 
specified in the table for the number of children due support 
1994 
78-45-7.13. Advisory committee — Membership and 
functions. 
(1) On or before March 1,1995, the governor shall appoint 
an advisory committee consisting of: 
(a) one representative recommended by the Office of 
Recovery Services; 
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the court shall adjust the amount of child support ordered 
to that which is provided for in the guidelines, 
(j^ Notice of the on^ortunitv to adjust a svi^ort order 
Yider Subsections 16> and H) shall l>e included in each child 
^pport order issued or modified after July 1,1997. 1997 
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y^-45-7.3. Procedure — Documentat ion — Stipulat ion. 
' (1) In a default or uncontested proceeding, the moving 
jurty shall submit: 
* (a) a completed child support worksheet; 
(b) the financial verification required by Subsection 
78-45-7.5(5); and 
(c) a written statement indicating whether or not the 
amount of child support requested is consistent with the 
guidelines. 
(2) (a) If the documentation of income required under Sub-
section (1) is not available, a verified representation of the 
defaulting party's income by the moving party, based on 
the best evidence available, may be submitted. 
(b) The evidence shall be in affidavit form and may only 
be offered after a copy has been provided to the defaulting 
party in accordance with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or 
Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in 
an administrative proceeding. 
(3) (a) In a stipulated proceeding, one of the moving parties 
shall submit: 
(i) a completed child support worksheet; 
(ii) the financial verification required by Subsec-
tion 78-45-7.5(5); and 
Vm> a written statement lnoicating whether or not 
the amount of child support requested is consistent 
with the guidelines. 
(b) A hearing is not required, but the guidelines shall 
be used to review the adequacy of a child support order 
negotiated by the parents. 
(c) A stipalated amount for child support or combined 
child support and alimony is adequate under the guide-
lines if the stipulated child support amount or combined 
amount equals or exceeds the base child support award 
required by the guidelines. 1994 
7&~45-7.4. Obl igat ion —Adjusted gross income used . 
Adjusted gross income shall be used in calculating each 
parent's share of the base combined child support obligation. 
Only income of the natural or adoptive parents of the child 
jjjay be used to determine the award under these guidelines. 
1994 
<7#-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed 
income. 
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes: 
(a) prospective income from any source, including 
nonearned. sources, except under Subsection (3); and 
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royal-
ties, bonuses, rents, gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, 
from previous marriages/annuities, capital gains, social 
security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unem-
ployment compensation, disability insurance benefits, 
and payments from "nonmeans-tested" government pro-
grams. 
(2) Income from earned income sources Tis limited to the 
equivalent of one full-time 40-hour job. However, if and only if 
during the time prior to the original support order, the parent 
normally and consistently worked more than 40 hours at his 
job, the court may consider this extra time as a pattern in 
calculating the parent's ability to provide child support. 
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are: o 
* '*$*{*) cash assistance provided under Title 35A, Chapter 
3, Part 3, Family Employment Program;' >c 
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, 
the Job Training Partnership Act, Supplemental Security 
Income, Social Security Disability Insurance, Medicaid, 
Tood Stamps, or tjeneral Assistance; ana 
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits re-
ceived by a parent. 
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of 
a busmess shall be calculated by subtracting necessary 
expenses required for self-employment or business opera-
tion from gross receipts. The income and expenses from 
self-employment or operation of a business shall be re-
viewed to determine an appropriate level of gross income 
available to the parent to satisfy a child support award. 
Only those expenses necessary to allow the business to 
operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross 
receipts. 
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection 
may differ from the amount of business income deter-
mined for tax purposes. 
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be com-
puted on an annual basis and then recalculated to deter-
mine the average gross monthly income. 
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current 
income. Each parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs 
or employer statements and complete copies of tax re-
turns from at least the most recent year unless the court 
finds the verification is not reasonably available. Verifica-
tion of mcome from records maintained by the Depart-
stubs, employer statements, and income tax returns. 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to 
determine whether an underemployment or over-
employment situation exists. 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent 
tender Subsection (7). 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the 
parent stipulates to the amount imputed or a hearing is 
held and a finding made that the parent is voluntarily 
unemployed or underemployed. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be 
based upon employment potential and probable earnings 
as derived from work history, occupation qualifications, 
and prevailing earnings for persons of similar back-
grounds in the community. 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall 
be imputed at least at the federal minimum wage for a 
40-hour work week. To impute a greater income, the judge 
in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an 
administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of 
fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following 
conditions exist: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the par-
ents' minor children approach or equal the amount of 
income the custodial parent can earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to 
the extent he cannot earn minimum wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational 
training to establish basic job skills; or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child 
a require the custodial parent's presence in the home, (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child ho is the subject of a child support award nor benefits to 
a child in the child's own right such as Supplemental 
Security Income. 
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to 
ine earnings of a parent shall be credited as child support 
to the parent upon whose earning record i i is based, by 
Crediting the amount against the potential obligation of 
